University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2006

What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It's Illegal
John Cary Sims
Pacific McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Privacy Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sims, John Cary, "What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It's Illegal" (2006). McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles. 133.
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles/133

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information,
please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

SIMSPE3

6/26/2006 1:56 PM

What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal
by JOHN CARY SIMS*

Introduction
On December 16, 2005, The New York Times disclosed the
existence of a secret electronic surveillance program being carried out
by the National Security Agency (NSA) that involves warrantless
interception of the contents of international communications engaged
in by “United States persons” – citizens of the United States and
1
aliens admitted for permanent residence. Although details of exactly
what NSA is doing have not been officially disclosed, the President,
the Attorney General, and the former director of NSA (who has now
become the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) have all
acknowledged that a new “Terrorist Surveillance Program” that goes
beyond the boundaries previously respected was initiated in October
2
2001. Even without the factual predicates that would make debate

* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Co-Editor-inChief, Journal of National Security Law & Policy. This article is based upon a
presentation made at the Hastings College of the Law on March 29, 2006. I am grateful
for the research assistance provided by Joshua D. Moore (Pacific McGeorge Class of
2007).
1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. This article will not analyze another NSA program that has
been more recently described, which consists of the analysis of large quantities of
information about domestic telephone calls, but without acquisition by the government of
the contents of the calls. See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’
Phone Calls; 3 Telecoms Help Government Collect Billions of Domestic Records, USA
TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 1A. Such data-mining raises interesting and important issues,
but they are distinct for the most part from those addressed here. See Letter from William
E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, Responses to Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, March 24, 2006,
at 37 [hereinafter DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee] (“the Terrorist
Surveillance Program is not a ‘data-mining’ program”) (emphasis in original), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj032406.pdf.
2. See, e.g., DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses to
Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 25 (“The Program was first authorized and
implemented in October 2001.”). The Justice Department has indicated that it is not
aware of any prior occasion, since the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
in 1978, in which authorization was given for “electronic surveillance” as defined in the
[101]
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about the legality of the program a more illuminating and satisfying
endeavor, there have been numerous efforts to describe and analyze
3
the once-secret surveillance efforts and assess their legality. This
article will provide a more detailed description than has previously
been available of exactly what it is that NSA is doing. Once the
nature of the program is more clearly understood, the conclusion that
4
it violates the law as it stands is unavoidable.
I. Title III, Keith, and FISA
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
5
things to be seized.

Act without obtaining a warrant. Id., Responses to Joint Questions from House Judiciary
Minority Members, at 11.
3. For example, the Department of Justice has prepared and widely disseminated a
42-page memorandum supporting the program. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf. The view that the program is plainly illegal was presented in an
answering letter signed by over a dozen distinguished law professors and former
government officials. Letter to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, et al., from Curtis
A. Bradley, Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law, Duke University, et al., Feb. 2,
2006, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/pdf/ second_letter.pdf.
4. The Senate Judiciary Committee has held a number of hearings to explore the
program, and one possible legislative response under consideration would be to amend the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to permit court approval of surveillance programs
designed to accomplish the purposes identified by the Bush administration as justifying the
ongoing program, with the requirement that the ongoing program then be promptly
submitted for review. See S. 2453, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006) (sponsored by Sen.
Specter, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee); Walter Pincus, Specter Offers
Compromise on NSA Surveillance, WASH. POST, June 9, 2006, at A4 (describing a revised
proposal introduced by Senator Specter at a meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee);
Editorial, NSA Train Wreck; An Effort To Get NSA Surveillance Under Control Is
Morphing into a License To Spy, WASH. POST, June 12, 2006, at A20 (“In an effort to win
votes, Mr. Specter has turned [S. 2453] from a flawed accountability measure into one that
rewrites the rules of domestic surveillance and gives the administration an all but blank
check to spy.”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that electronic eavesdropping,
even in the absence of physical intrusion, may constitute a search
6
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In recognition of the
threat to privacy interests posed by electronic surveillance, Congress
in 1968 enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
7
Streets Act. Title III established detailed requirements for the
issuance of federal and state warrants authorizing electronic
intercepts, and the statute also created an elaborate system for
8
keeping records of and making reports about electronic surveillance.
In national security matters such as those involved in the fight against
terrorism, the federal government may at any time avail itself of the
Title III process to obtain warrants based on a showing of probable
cause that serious crimes have been committed or are about to be
9
committed.
However, the Executive rejects such close judicial
supervision of national security interceptions, based on the
contention that such limitations on the President in the intelligence
field are inconsistent with his responsibilities for national defense and
foreign relations. The present controversy is only the latest chapter in
a long-running effort by Presidents to undertake electronic
surveillance for national security purposes without the necessity to
obtain Title III warrants, and indeed to resist the application of any
warrant requirement in a number of situations.
An occasion to explore the applicability of the Title III
restrictions on electronic surveillance to national security matters was
presented to the Supreme Court in United States v. United States
10
District Court, often referred to as the “Keith” case because then
11
District Judge Damon J. Keith became the subject of an application
for a writ of mandamus filed by the government to challenge the
district court’s order requiring disclosure of certain electronic
surveillance information. The court of appeals upheld the district
court’s ruling. The case involved national security, since one
6. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. 82 Stat. 213 (1968), codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
8. Annual reports are prepared by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts for transmittal to Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 2519(3) (2000). The most recent report
indicates that in 2005, a total of 1,773 intercept orders were approved, of which 625 were
issued by federal courts. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 WIRETAP
REPORT 5 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap05/ contents.html.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000).
10. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
11. Judge Keith was later appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, where he now is a senior judge.
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defendant was accused of bombing an office of the Central
12
Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan, but the perceived
threat did not arise from the activities of foreign powers. The
Attorney General described the warrantless surveillance as designed
“to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to
13
attack and subvert the existing structure of Government.”
The
government took the position that it was unnecessary to obtain Title
III warrants in such domestic security cases, but the Supreme Court
rejected its arguments and affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals.
The Keith decision is highly relevant to the analysis of the
current surveillance program, but it also left a number of important
questions unanswered. The government relied heavily on the
language then contained in Title III that stated that the statute should
not “be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to
take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the
14
structure or existence of the Government.”
Although the
government argued that this language excepted all national security
wiretaps from Title III, the Supreme Court concluded to the contrary
15
that “Congress simply left presidential powers where it found them.”
The Court recognized that national security concerns raised by the
16
government were serious, and that domestic security surveillance
“may involve different policy and practical considerations from
17
‘ordinary crime,’” but the Court ultimately concluded that advance
approval of electronic surveillance by a neutral and detached judicial
18
officer is required in domestic security matters. Even so, the Court
made it clear that its holding applied only to domestic security
matters, not those involving foreign intelligence:

12. Keith, 407 U.S. at 299, 308.
13. Id. at 309 (emphasis supplied by the Supreme Court in quoting the affidavit of the
Attorney General).
14. Id. at 302, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). This language was later repealed. Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1783, 1797.
15. Id. at 303.
16. Id. at 311.
17. Id. at 322.
18. Id. at 317 (“unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to
obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech”).
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We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the
issues which may be involved with respect to activities of
19
foreign powers or their agents.
While disclaiming any intent to guide congressional action, the
Supreme Court then proceeded in Keith to suggest a possible way of
reconciling a warrant requirement with the practicalities of the
intelligence field. The Court observed that standards for the issuance
of a warrant “may vary according to the governmental interest to be
enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.” This
might lead Congress to conclude that new warrant requirements
should be crafted that would be “more appropriate to domestic
security cases,” that authorization could be given by “any member of
a specially designated court,” and that the time and reporting
20
requirements of Title III could be relaxed. This stunningly prescient
(or persuasive) formulation by the Supreme Court provides the
backbone of the legislative compromise over foreign intelligence
surveillance that became the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
21
1978 (FISA).
Even though the rough blueprint drawn up the
Supreme Court in Keith closely resembles the system created by
Congress in FISA, Congress has never seen the need to override the
holding of Keith as to domestic security cases, which remain subject to
the restrictions of Title III.
Between the Supreme Court’s decision in Keith and the
enactment of FISA in 1978, Congress devoted substantial attention to
infringements of civil liberties by agencies of the United States,
particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and NSA. The Watergate hearings, as well as the
investigations of the Church Committee and the Pike Committee,
exposed numerous abuses of power. Most significantly for present
purposes, the revelations covered the use of break-ins and electronic
surveillance against United States citizens based on their exercise of
First Amendment rights. The exposure of NSA “watch lists”
targeting antiwar protestors bolstered efforts to make national
security surveillance subject to statutory standards. Development of
a statutory system was also stimulated by the constitutional ambiguity
generated by Keith. Supporters of reform hoped, and generally
19. Id. at 321-22.
20. Id. at 323.
21. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§1801-1811 (2003 &
Supp. 2005).
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predicted, that when the Supreme Court was presented with a case
involving warrantless electronic surveillance in a foreign intelligence
matter it would conclude that it would not be consistent with the
Fourth Amendment for the Executive to be permitted to conduct
even national security “searches” without judicial supervision. The
Executive, on the other hand, took heart from Keith’s explicit
announcement that the holding did not apply to foreign security
cases, and the suggestion that warrants might not be needed in cases
22
involving foreign powers. At the same time, Keith’s recital of the
threat to personal liberties posed by allowing surveillance to be put in
23
place on the basis of “unreviewed executive discretion” seemed to
be as applicable to foreign intelligence wiretaps as to those directed at
domestic security threats.
Extensive congressional deliberation, in the shadow of the risks
that each side saw in the potential for an ultimate Supreme Court
decision to go against it on the central question left open in Keith, led
to FISA. This is not the occasion to thoroughly canvass the statute,
but the basic approach taken in foreign intelligence cases was that
suggested by the Court in Keith as a possible solution to the problem
of domestic security wiretaps. Warrants would be required, but they
would not be Title III warrants based on probable cause that a crime
had been committed or was imminent. Rather, warrants would be
justified upon a showing that there was probable cause to believe that
24
the target is a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power. This is
uniformly agreed to be a standard that is easier to meet than the Title
III standard.
Applications for FISA warrants go to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC), a special court created by the statute, made
up of eleven Article III district court judges who are designated by the
Chief Justice of the United States to carry out the additional duties of
25
judges of the FISC. An application for a FISA warrant is considered

22. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322 & n.20.
23. Id. at 317.
24. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (2003 & Supp. 2005). The definition of “foreign power”
includes “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.”
Id. at § 1801(a)(4). Eventually it was recognized that electronic surveillance might also be
appropriate if directed at an international terrorist who is not affiliated with a foreign
power. This problem was addressed, despite the grammatical awkwardness, by defining
such a lone wolf to be an “agent of a foreign power.” Id. at § 1801(b)(1)(C).
25. Id. at § 1803(a). Prior to passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, the FISC
had seven judges. The statute also provides for a court of review, made up of three Article
III judges designated by the Chief Justice. Id. at § 1803(b).
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by a single judge, with a rotation set up to assure that a judge is always
available in or near Washington, D.C. to consider an application that
26
The statute requires that annual
requires immediate attention.
reports be sent to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, although the information provided is much less detailed than
27
in the reports required by Title III.
II. How NSA Operates
Those who go to the movies or read spy novels are frequently
exposed to the hypothesis that the National Security Agency listens in
on all private electronic communications at will, whether they are
conducted by telephone, fax, or e-mail. A near-omniscience is
attributed to the organization, except for communications that are
kept out of the air altogether, such as by being delivered in personal
conversation, by hand, or through the mails. One focus of concern,
especially in Europe, has been the system code-named “Echelon,”
which was described in a report to the European Parliament as being
“designed
to
indiscriminately
intercept
the
non-military
communications of governments, private organizations, and
businesses on behalf of the United States and its primary partners in
the decades-old UKUSA signals intelligence alliance – Britain,
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Items of intelligence value are
selected by computer identification of keywords provided by the
28
UKUSA nations.”
26. At least three of the judges reside within twenty miles of the District of Columbia.
Id. at § 1803(a).
27. The most recent report indicates that during 2005 a total of 2,074 applications
were made to the FISC for warrants to conduct electronic surveillance, make physical
searches, or both. Two applications were withdrawn before they were ruled on; 2,072
applications were granted, with 61 of those having been the subject of substantive
modifications by the court; no application was denied in whole or part. Letter to J. Dennis
Hastert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, from William E. Moschella, Assistant
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, April 28, 2006, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.html.
28. Jeffrey Richelson, Desperately Seeking Signals; The National Security Agency’s
Echelon Program, BULL. ATOMIC SCI., March/April 2000 (Vol. 56, No. 02), at 47.
Richelson persuasively demonstrates that “Echelon” is only one aspect of the NSA’s
interception of communications, and that the innovation it represents is the large-scale
computerized exchange among the cooperating nations of raw intercepts, as opposed to
finished reports. His short article also provides an excellent overview of the activities of
NSA. Although the agency was once so obscure that it was appropriate to joke that its
initials were an acronym for “No Such Agency,” there is now a substantial body of
published work about it. See, e.g., JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF
THE ULTRA-SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (Anchor 2002); JAMES BAMFORD,
THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA’S MOST SECRET AGENCY (1982);
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Even given NSA’s immense human and computer resources,
interception and analysis of all electronic communications is not
29
A first obstacle is the immense volume of electronic
possible.
communication, including telephones (landlines and cellular), e-mails,
and other forms. General Michael V. Hayden, who directed NSA for
six years before becoming Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, and more recently Director of the CIA, has testified that
the “explosion in telecommunications” has brought about a situation
in which the percentage of signals collected by NSA, relative to the
30
overall volume of signals, has “never been smaller.”
A second
significant practical difficulty is that many communications, and
certainly a significant percentage of those of primary interest to the
U.S. intelligence community, are not in English, and few competent
31
linguists may be available to work in the critical languages. Third,
the communications may be encrypted or encoded; this is certainly
not a new problem, but one that is exacerbated by the ready
PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, CHATTER: DISPATCHES FROM THE SECRET WORLD OF
GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING (2005); Lawrence D. Sloan, ECHELON and the Legal
Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467 (2001).
29. This discussion addresses only technical feasibility. There also are legal limits,
which will be discussed below.
30. The National Security Agency: Hearing Before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2000 (Lexis, News Library) [hereinafter Hayden 2000
House Testimony] (testimony of Gen. Hayden); see also id. (“Our ability to collect may
have increased, but it has increased at a pace far slower and smaller than the explosion of
the 1s and 0s that are out there.”); JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY
OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 48 (2006) (“Today, industry experts
estimate that approximately 9 trillion e-mails are sent in the United States each year.
Americans make nearly a billion cell phone calls and well over a billion landline calls each
day.”); Richelson, supra note 28 (“The UKUSA SIGINT agencies certainly do not
intercept every signal that passes through the airwaves.”).
SIGINT is “signals
intelligence,” a term that was defined by General Hayden in his prepared remarks for the
House Intelligence Committee hearings on April 12, 2000: “Signals intelligence is
comprised of communications intelligence and electronics intelligence. Communications
intelligence consists of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other
electromagnetic means and electronics intelligence consists of foreign electromagnetic
radiations such as emissions from a radar system.” Michael V. Hayden, Statement for the
Record, Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12,
2000, at 6 n.4, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/hayden.html.
31. See James Bamford, The Agency That Could Be Big Brother, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25,
2005, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1:
During the cold war, the agency could depend on a constant flow of
American-born Russian linguists from the many universities around
the country with Soviet studies programs. Now the government is
forced to search ethnic communities to find people who can speak
Dari, Urdu or Lingala – and also pass a security clearance that frowns
on people with relatives in their, or their parents’, former countries.
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32

availability of encryption software to private individuals. Another
difficulty is the “significant limit imposed on the ability to monitor
voice communications” because of the ineffectiveness of
33
computerized systems for spotting words in aural communications.
General Hayden has noted that this problem may not be as urgent as
it once was, since “E-mail is a bit going back to the future, looking a
lot more like telex, which is the roots of our organization, reading the
printed word, rather than the recent past of our organization, which is
34
dealing with the spoken word.” A fifth concern is that some signals
may also be difficult for NSA to acquire, or perhaps unavailable
altogether, because they are transmitted through fiber-optic cables
35
rather than being sent through the air by microwave or satellite.
Despite all the difficulties faced by NSA, it remains true that
“NSA and its allies clearly do intercept an enormous volume of
36
data.” In testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence in 2000, General Hayden addressed concerns raised
by the American Civil Liberties Union that NSA’s capabilities could
be used against Americans. His statement emphasized that there are
“absolutely clear rules” prohibiting such practices, but went on to
make a point that is highly pertinent in analyzing the agency’s

32. The availability of more powerful personal computers and the development of
public key cryptography made it practicable for private parties to use effective encryption
at low cost. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, The Intelligence Gap: How the Digital Age Left
Our Spies Out in the Cold, NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 1999, at 58 (reporting that “the agency’s
long fight against encryption delayed its widespread use by many years” but that
“encryption could not be stopped”).
33. Richelson, supra note 28 (“In 1993, former NSA director Bobby Inman admitted
that ‘I have wasted more U.S. taxpayer dollars trying to do that [word spotting in speech]
than anything else in my intelligence career.’”). Whatever limitations exist on the
effectiveness of voice transcription systems would not prevent NSA from acquiring and
recording a given telephone conversation, but the incentive to engage in any given
surveillance program is substantially reduced if it requires a large investment of resources
(such as the use of a linguist) to convert the content of the call into usable form.
Richelson notes that even in the absence of effective word spotting by computers, “the
phones of the parties involved in a call can be automatically identified and voiceprints can
be used to identify who is speaking.” Id. Even if one assumes that Inman’s 1993
statement was accurate, it remains possible that a breakthrough has been achieved since
that time. See BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 556 (“A recent
breakthrough was made by biomedical engineers at the University of Southern California,
who claim to have created the first machine system that can recognize spoken words better
than humans can.”).
34. Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30.
35. Richelson, supra note 28.
36. Id.
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technological limitations as well as the legal constraints under which it
operates. He stated:
There is a powerful element of truth in the ACLU text,
okay. And that talks about opportunity or capability.
For us to do our mission in today’s telecommunications
world requires a substantial amount of capability, okay.
It’s theoretically possible for us to use that capability –
technologically possible to use that capability in ways that
37
are prohibited. Of course I have to answer yes.
All informed observers agree that the ability of NSA to intercept
electronic communications is very large, even if it is not effectively
unlimited, as is sometimes alleged. Thus, in exploring the legal issues
raised by the recent NSA electronic surveillance program, it is
prudent to assume that almost any electronic communication that is
sent through the air can be acquired by NSA if it is deemed to be
38
worth the effort.
That brings us to the aspect of its operations that NSA guards
most closely. Since it has the technical capacity to intercept a large
percentage of the electronic communications that flood the modern
39
world, but it cannot with the available personnel and other resources
intercept and analyze all of them, it must set priorities. Day in and
37. Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30.
38. NSA’s access to communications transmitted on fiber-optic cables remains
unknown, but it has recently been alleged that it taps into the cables “by using specially
designed submarines, such as the USS Jimmy Carter, to attach a complex ‘bug’ to the cable
itself.” James Bamford, Big Brother Is Listening, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 2006, at 65,
68; see KEEFE, supra note 28, at 73-75. It has also been alleged that NSA has been granted
direct access to the networks of telecommunications carriers, making it unnecessary to
seek to obtain signals from fiber-optic cables. See, e.g., id. at 68 (stating that fiber-optic
cables entering the United States from Europe and Asia are tapped at the landing stations
where they come ashore); Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data
Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, December 24, 2005, at A1 (reporting that NSA “has
gained the cooperation of American telecommunications companies to obtain backdoor
access to streams of domestic and international communications” and that the agency has
“in the last few years been quietly encouraging the telecommunications industry to
increase the amount of international traffic that is routed through American-based
switches”). Communications sent by fiber-optic cables would also be vulnerable to
interception if sent through the air at any point in their path from sender to recipient.
39. The degree of success that NSA achieves in its efforts to keep up with the evergrowing flood of electronic communications is disputed. Compare note 30 supra and
accompanying text and Hersh, supra note 32, with Bamford, supra note 38, at 70 (stating
that NSA personnel “are close to achieving” their “ultimate goal of intercepting and
reviewing every syllable and murmur zapping into, out of, or through the United States”).
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day out, NSA must make decisions about what communications it will
intercept, which ones it will store for future reference, which ones it
will subject to preliminary screening by computers, which ones will be
routed for inspection by a human analyst, and ultimately which ones
will be given a full analysis that will be transmitted to its “customers”
in the intelligence community, including the President. As General
Hayden has stated, “there is a great demand that we focus what it is
that we can work against on the highest-priority legitimate foreign
40
intelligence targets we have.” Plainly, the effectiveness of NSA’s
efforts could be greatly diminished if it were known what channels of
communications it is intercepting, or which ones it places special
emphasis on, or for that matter which ones it has decided are not
worth the effort to intercept and analyze. Those who wished to avoid
detection would choose modes or channels of communication that are
not monitored, or that receive low emphasis from NSA. On the other
hand, one hostile to the United States who knows that a given
channel is being closely monitored may deliberately transmit false
41
information or otherwise act to manipulate U.S. responses.
The setting and implementation of priorities is at the very heart
of what NSA does. It can focus on particular modes or channels of
communication, particular locations, particular phone numbers or email addresses, characteristics of the communication (e.g. length,
language, use of encryption), and content, such as particular names,
42
words, phone numbers, or combinations of these.
No doubt
40. Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30.
41. There is no limit to the permutations that are possible. James Bamford had
reported that (at least as of the time he collected information for his most recent book)
“NSA regularly listens to unencrypted calls from suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden, in
hiding in Afghanistan,” that bin Laden “is aware that the United States can eavesdrop on
his international communications, but he does not seem to care,” and that NSA analysts
“play audiotapes of Bin Laden talking to his mother” in order to impress visitors.
BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 410. In the Afterword to the paperback
edition of the book, Bamford states that bin Laden changed tactics in 1998 after “an
American missile attack on his compound in Afghanistan made him think twice about
using satellite communications.” Id. at 614. He alleges that since that time bin Laden has
communicated through messengers who make calls for him, and that even so NSA
intercepted a call in early September 2001 from a bin Laden associate to bin Laden’s wife,
urging her to return to Afghanistan from Syria. Id. at 616-17. Bamford indicates that the
call “was filed away” without its significance being recognized. Id. at 617.
42. Jeffrey Richelson reports that, at least in the context of the discussion of the
“Echelon” program, screening of content is accomplished through the use of
“dictionaries” of keywords. Richelson, supra note 28. A simple version of keyword
screening would be compilation of a “watch list” like those used by NSA in the programs
investigated by the Church Committee, in which communications by, to, or about certain
individuals were targeted. James Bamford contends that a computer, codenamed
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communications between Russia and the Russian embassy in
Washington have long been the target of intense focus by NSA.
Thus, an effort might well be made to acquire and store every
possible communication, even those that are encrypted at a high level.
After 9/11, there can be no doubt about the fact that communications
between the United States and such nations as Afghanistan, Iraq,
Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have been very high on NSA’s list of
priorities. It may well be that all accessible international phone calls
and e-mails are screened to some extent, but it would seem plausible
that calls between England and France would receive less emphasis
than those between Afghanistan and Europe, or calls within the
Middle East. NSA no doubt can acquire radio communications by
taxicabs around the world, but whether it wants to do so absent a
specific reason is another matter. NSA has an enormous appetite for
electronic transmissions, but it still must make choices rather than
ordering everything on the menu. Although the transcription of this
testimony by General Hayden is a bit garbled, he captures the essence
of the difficult task that NSA is attempting to carry out as it processes
the messages that it has intercepted:
We collect far more information than we process, analyze
far more – process more than we analyze and report less
than we – it’s a funnel, and it narrows. And [an intercept]
may never come to our attention, and be shunted off and
destroyed in that sense, without the intervention of any
43
of our operators.
An additional window into NSA’s processing of the flood of
signals it intercepts was provided by an incident that began on

Dictionary, searches for “keywords, names, phrases, telephone and fax numbers.”
BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 409. The basics of the screening process
can easily be imagined by one familiar with the Lexis and Westlaw legal research systems,
or even with the broad searching possible through Google.
43. Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30 (emphasis added). General Hayden
was responding to a question about what would happen to an intercept containing
“inadvertent information on an American,” but his description of how intercepts are
processed appears to be generally applicable. One of General Hayden’s predecessors as
director of NSA described a collection system that generated a million inputs per hour,
with the following results: “filters throw away all but 6,500 inputs; only 1,000 inputs meet
forwarding criteria; 10 inputs are normally selected by analysts and only one report is
produced.” Sloan, supra note 28, at 1480 (quoting a 1992 speech by Vice Admiral William
Studeman).
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January 24, 2000, when NSA’s computer system crashed. General
Hayden described the problem and NSA’s recovery from it in his
congressional testimony:
[I]t’s been in the press, about the outage at NSA in late
January. You know, a serious matter in which we have
already stated publicly for three and a half days we could
not process information.
But I’ve also stated publicly the collection systems
continued, and that we had the ability to store that which
we collected over this three and a half day period. And
that when we then were able to go back and process the
information when that capability came back, it took eight
to 12 hours to process and analyze the information that
we had collected and life got closely – in a close sense,
45
back to normal.
NSA’s mission, activities, resources, and culture are central
elements in the current controversy over warrantless surveillance of
the international electronic communications of United States persons
who are within the United States. The capacity of the agency to
intercept such communications is very broad, but the flow of data is
also enormous because of recent advances in communications. The
key to success is for NSA to tailor its targeting priorities to the needs
of the intelligence community, while keeping those priorities secret
from the targets and dealing with any technical problems that might
impair access to the desired signals. Patrick Radden Keefe has aptly
described “the intelligence cycle” that governs the work of NSA and
other agencies:
The cycle starts with planning and target selection, which
then leads naturally to collection of raw intelligence.
Next, the collected intelligence goes through processing,
then analysis and production of finished intelligence

44. See BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 451-54.
45. Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30; see KEEFE, supra note 28, at 109-10;
BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 454 (reporting that, during the outage,
much of the intercept traffic that would have normally gone to NSA was directed instead
to the agency’s British counterpart, GCHQ).
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reports, and ultimately distribution to interested parties,
46
before starting back at the planning stage again.
While Keefe is describing the process in terms applicable to any
intelligence agency, it accurately describes what NSA does in
intercepting communications and then processing and analyzing them
in order to produce finished reports for distribution. The one
additional aspect of NSA’s work that needs to be described in order
to permit an appropriate analysis of the warrantless surveillance
program is the legal framework within which NSA operates.

III. How Did NSA Handle Information About U.S. Persons Before
the New Warrantless Surveillance Program Was Put in Place?
The central component of the intricate system created by FISA
to regulate electronic surveillance is the concept of “agent of a
foreign power.” The FISC judge to whom an application is made
cannot issue a FISA warrant unless, in addition to finding that all the
other requirements of the statute have been complied with, the judge
finds that
on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant there is
probable cause to believe that –
(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power . . . and
(B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used,
47
by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power . . . .

46. KEEFE, supra note 28, at 109-10.
47. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(3) (2003 & Supp. 2005). There are many details in FISA
that do not call for discussion here. However, it is worth noting that the Attorney General
may authorize certain electronic surveillance without the need to seek a FISA warrant,
primarily when the target is an embassy or similar facility of a foreign nation. Id. at §
1802. In addition, the language of section 1805(a)(3)(A) quoted in the text omits an
important proviso designed to guard against abuses of the sort that NSA had committed in
the past: “Provided, That no United States person may be considered a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”
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Much turns, then, on the statutory definition of “an agent of a
foreign power,” since no individual may be subjected to electronic
surveillance that requires a FISA warrant unless there is probable
cause to believe that the person is such an agent. The statutory
definition is itself complex, but for present purposes it is only
necessary to explore when a United States person is considered an
48
agent of a foreign power. An individual is a “United States person”
49
if a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. A
United States person is an agent of a foreign power if he or she
“knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for
or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may
50
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States,” or
if he or she “knowingly” engages in similar activities that are
51
obviously inimical to the interests of the United States.
For
purposes of our discussion here, let us assume that the potential
subject of electronic surveillance is a United States person who could
potentially fall within the quoted portion of the definition.
Before we plunge more deeply into how the warrantless
electronic surveillance program should be analyzed as applied to the
United States person described above, it will be useful to identify a
number of situations that plainly do not fall within the scope of the
program as it has been described to the public. For purposes of this
discussion, let us assume that the communications in question take
place “under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law

48. The standard for so labeling those who are not United States persons is more
expansive. Id. at § 1801(b)(1). Any person, whether or not a United States person, is an
agent of a foreign power if he or she meets the narrower definition applicable to United
States persons. See id. at § 1801(b)(2).
49. Id. at § 1801(i). The definition also describes when an unincorporated association
or a corporation is a United States person.
50. Id. at § 1801(b)(2)(A).
51. Id. at § 1801(b)(2)(B)–(E). These additional categories of agents of foreign
powers include those who knowingly engage in certain clandestine intelligence activities at
the direction of and on behalf of a foreign power; knowingly engage in sabotage or
international terrorism or preparation therefore; knowingly use a false identity on behalf
of a foreign power; or knowingly aid or abet, or conspire to engage in, the activities
described in the first three parts of the definition. General Hayden succinctly summarized
the complex statutory definition: “a judge may determine a U.S. person to be an agent of a
foreign power only if there is information to support a finding that the individual is a spy,
terrorist, saboteur, or someone who aids or abets them.” Hayden, Statement for the
Record, supra note 30, at 3.
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52

enforcement purposes.” This discussion will be limited to situations
that do not fall within any of the following categories:
53

A Title III warrant has been issued.
A FISA warrant has been issued.

54

55

The United States person in question is outside the United States.

The government does not intend to intercept the contents of the
56
communication.
57

The interception occurs within the United States.

52. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1), (3)–(4). This is certainly an appropriate assumption for
telephone calls, faxes, and e-mails.
53. The essence of the FISA legislative compromise was to give the government a way
to obtain a warrant for electronic surveillance that did not require meeting the probable
cause standard applied in ordinary criminal cases. Therefore, in the hypothetical situation
described in the text the government would not choose to take upon itself the higher
burden of seeking a Title III warrant.
54. The current controversy has arisen precisely because the government has chosen
not to seek FISA warrants. If FISA warrants were sought, some might be denied. Most,
but not all, applications for FISA warrants have been granted.
55. United States persons who are outside the United States were explicitly excluded
from the reach of FISA. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1) (defining “electronic
surveillance” as the acquisition of the contents of certain communications to or from “a
particular, known United States person who is in the United States”). At the time FISA
was adopted, a number of those involved in the deliberations stated that additional
legislation would be crafted to deal specifically with United States persons outside the
United States, see, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the S. Comm. on Intelligence,
95th Cong. 39 (statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell) (“The next item of priority is
electronic surveillance of Americans overseas. We’ve agreed to do that next.”), but no
such legislation has ever been adopted. Executive Order 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec.
4, 1981), requires approval from the Attorney General before NSA interception can be
targeted against United States persons outside the United States. Id. at § 2.5.
56. The statutory definition of “electronic surveillance” includes only the acquisition
“of the contents” of a wire or radio communication. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1)–(3).
57. Acquisition of wire communications to or from a person in the United States,
when the interception occurs in the United States, is included in the definition of
“electronic surveillance,” and thus requires a warrant, unless a party to the communication
has given consent. There is a narrow exception applicable to communications of computer
trespassers. Id. at § 1801(f)(2), referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
Radio communications are included in “electronic surveillance” when “both the sender
and all intended recipients are located within the United States.” 50 U.S.C.A. §
1801(f)(3).
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The hub of the current controversy, then, is the subpart of the
FISA definition of “electronic surveillance” that addresses the
following situation:
the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is in the
United States, if the contents are acquired by
intentionally targeting that United States person, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
58
for law enforcement purposes . . . .
The warrantless surveillance program involves the acquisition by
NSA of the contents of international calls involving a United States
person who is within the United States, without issuance of a warrant.
FISA allows calls in this category to be intercepted only if they are
not “acquired by intentionally targeting” a “particular, known United
States person” who is either the sender or an intended recipient of the
communication.
Before discussing the legality of the warrantless surveillance
included in the current program, it would be useful to describe how
NSA has traditionally dealt with international electronic
communications that include information about a United States
person. General Hayden’s testimony in 2000 before the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is highly illuminating on
this issue:
There are other circumstances envisaged by the
legislation, by the FISA act, that from time to time we
will unintentionally acquire information to, from or about
U.S. persons. . . . Under the statute, I may retain and
disseminate information unintentionally acquired to,
from or about American persons only if the information
is necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence
information. What do we need [sic] by “to or from”
American persons? I’ll give you an example there.
We’ve got someone outside the United States speaking a

58. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1).
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foreign language, engaged in a terrorist plot, terrorist
activities, and only later in subsequent conversations do
we find revealed in such conversations that that person
has an American identity – he carries an American
passport or she has an American green card. This is
information incidentally unintentionally acquired about
an American person. The information acquired up to
that point can be used in accordance with the FISA
statute if it is necessary to understand or assess foreign
intelligence information. I cannot continue to target that
person without going through the processes I’ve
59
described to you earlier.
General Hayden described a communication involving a United
States person outside the United States. No FISA warrant would be
required even if the United States person were within the United
States, unless the interception targeted the United States person. Let
us focus on calls somehow selected by NSA for interception overseas
on a basis other than participation in the call of a United States
person who is within the United States. Perhaps calls are made from
Afghanistan, and NSA is intercepting all electronic communications
between the United States and Afghanistan. Calls may be made from
a phone number in Afghanistan known to be used by terrorists, and
therefore targeted by NSA. It may be the time, or duration, or the
subject matter of the calls that leads to their interception, and that
focuses NSA’s attention on a United States person within the United
States. There is no problem with the initial interceptions, since we
are assuming they were not acquired by intentionally targeting the
United States person.
Can the United States person who is now of interest be added to
a watch list or dictionary so that any future international calls to or
from him will be intercepted? The answer is “no,” since taking that
step would be intentionally targeting a United States person within
the United States. Of course, that would not really be a problem
under the facts described by General Hayden, even for a United
States person within the United States, since the contents of the calls
already intercepted would clearly establish that the United States
person is an agent of a foreign power. Thus, the FISC would
59. Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30. Earlier in his testimony, General
Hayden had described the FISA warrant process. See also supra note 55 (discussing the
treatment of United States persons who are outside the United States).
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unquestionably grant a warrant upon request, permitting complete
coverage of the target’s international and domestic electronic
60
communications.
What about use and retention of the communications already
intercepted, particularly if the situation is not a clear-cut one in which
the government will obtain a FISA warrant? As described by
General Hayden, NSA has quite elaborate procedures designed to
minimize the intrusion on the privacy interests of United States
61
persons as to whom information is incidentally acquired by NSA.
Under most circumstances, the identity of a United States person will
be deleted from the intelligence reports circulated by NSA, with the
name replaced by “U.S. Person.” However, the protection for
privacy is substantially less than it at first appears. If one of the
intelligence agencies receiving a report requests the identity, NSA
will provide the information if it is determined to be necessary to
understand the foreign intelligence information or assess its
62
importance.
General Hayden stated that “from time to time [NSA] will
63
unintentionally acquire information to, from or about U.S. persons.”
This suggests that unintentional collection of such information about
United States persons is not a serious problem, especially in light of
NSA’s restrictions on the retention and dissemination of the
identifying information unless it is needed to understand or assess the
intercepted communication. Such an understanding would, however,
60. Once the FISA probable cause standard is met, the government can even get
warrants going beyond electronic intercepts, such as for audio or video surveillance or for
physical searches.
61. The detailed NSA manual that regulates the collection, processing, retention, and
dissemination of electronic communications to, from, or about United States persons has
been released to the public, although with significant redactions. NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, UNITED STATES SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE 18, LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, July 27, 1993
[hereinafter USSID 18], available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB23/07-01.htm. USSID 18 is supplemented by a detailed manual further
regulating the handling of information about United States persons. The version that has
been released is riddled with deletions. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL
SECURITY SERVICE, U.S. IDENTITIES IN SIGINT, March 1994, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/16-01.htm.
62. See USSID 18, supra note 61, at § 7.2(c); BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra
note 28, at 448 (“Although NSA takes great pains to eliminate the names of U.S. persons
in the reports it sends out, any customer (for instance, CIA or DIA) can obtain the names
simply by faxing a request to NSA. The request must offer a reason and state that the
name ‘is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or assess its importance.’”). See
generally id. at 441-49.
63. Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30.
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fail to appreciate the significance of the way in which NSA goes about
collecting communications. While some interceptions are narrowly
targeted on particular phone numbers or specific individuals, in other
instances NSA picks up all or a significant portion of the
communications on certain communications channels or in certain
locations. For example, under current circumstances it must be
assumed that NSA is very aggressive in seeking to acquire
64
international communications going into or coming out of Iran.
Therefore, NSA’s processing of the calls inevitably will turn up
information about United States persons in the United States
(perhaps those with relatives in Iran) who have been involved in or
mentioned in communications that were intercepted. NSA has never
disclosed how frequent such “unintentional” acquisition of
information about United States persons is, and outsiders are not well
placed to make a quantitative estimate, but it seems clear that such
interceptions are frequent and growing.
James Bamford, an
acknowledged expert on NSA and the author of two books about the
agency, has observed:
The deliberate targeting of Americans is only one issue.
The other is what is done when an American – or a
citizen of one of the other UKUSA nations – incidentally
turns up in the reams of intercepted traffic. This is
becoming more and more likely as technology advances.
“The networks have collapsed into one another,” said
one senior NSA official, “and many of our targets are on
the same network that we use. It is just ‘the network’ –
65
the global telecommunications infrastructure.”
It turns out that communications that are “unintentionally” or
“incidentally” acquired by NSA because they were not targeted may

64. The agency is certainly intercepting communications within Iran as well, but that
does not raise issues under FISA, since neither end of the call would involve a United
States person in the United States.
65. BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 441-42. Admiral Hayden was
interviewed extensively by Bamford in the preparation of the book. Bamford provides
one dramatic example of an incident in which interception not targeted at a United States
person nonetheless produced highly personal information about him. “In 1980, while
intercepting everything in and out of Libya, NSA analysts discovered that President
Jimmy Carter’s brother Billy was doing business with and acting as an unregistered agent
of the Libyan government.” Id. at 443.
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constitute a very significant proportion of the communications that
are intercepted:
A large volume of information flowing through the same
signal increases the likelihood that incidental information
will be collected. In addition, the fact that many different
types of communications flow over the same media
results in increased incidental interceptions unrelated to
the target of the surveillance. Modern communication
satellites are capable of carrying various forms of
communication, including television, telephone, and data.
Governmental communications often travel over the
same signals as private communications, creating a
situation in which an innocent man’s telephone call to his
wife can be transmitted over the same signal as a report
from the Chinese embassy to Beijing. Given these
developments in the field of COMINT collection and
communication
technology,
this
exception
for
incidentally acquired information threatens to swallow
66
the entire rule.
IV. How Does the Warrantless Surveillance Program Handle
“Unintentionally” Collected Information
About United States Persons?
The warrantless surveillance program appears to significantly
expand the interception of international electronic communications
involving United States persons by taking “unintentionally”
intercepted communications to, from, or about an individual, and
using them as a basis for targeting future communications involving
67
that person.
As discussed above, General Hayden’s original
66. Sloan, supra note 28, at 1503-04. For a definition of Comint, see supra note 30.
Although the focus on governmental communications may be less intense now than it was
prior to 9/11, as terrorist groups like al Qaeda have become more urgent targets, the point
that Sloan is making remains valid. The same circuits that carry the communications of al
Qaeda adherents in Afghanistan or Pakistan also carry communications from many other
individuals and organizations. If NSA chooses to intercept the entire stream of
communications over the circuit, in order to make sure that the al Qaeda messages being
sought are captured, then the large volume of messages involving others are considered
incidentally intercepted.
67. Since the operational details of the program have not been disclosed, it is possible
that it goes further. Thus, the United States persons whose international calls are targeted
by NSA may include not only those who send, receive, or are mentioned in intercepted

SIMS PE3

122

6/26/2006 1:56 PM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33:2&3

scenario, in which interceptions not targeted on a United States
person provided convincing evidence that he is an agent of a foreign
power, presents no challenge. In that case, the government could use
the intercepted communications to obtain a FISA warrant covering
all electronic communications to or from that person. But what if a
suspected terrorist in Pakistan calls a United States person in the
United States, the call is intercepted and analyzed upon criteria that
have nothing to do with the United States person, and upon
examination its contents appear completely innocuous? Analysts
might feel that the very fact that the suspected terrorist called the
United States person raises suspicions about the United States
person, perhaps even strong ones. This situation, however, would
probably not be enough to secure issuance of a FISA warrant, since
the apparently innocuous phone call would not provide probable
cause to believe that the United States person is an agent of a foreign
power. What if a second communication (assuming once again that it
is intercepted without targeting the United States person) passes
between the two individuals? An active dialogue between the
suspected terrorist and the U.S. person, even if the contents of the
communications appear innocent, might well at some point provide
the probable cause needed for issuance of a FISA warrant, but it
would not necessarily be easy to say when the tipping point would be
reached.
The information that is publicly available strongly suggests that
these are the types of situations in which the Administration’s
surveillance program calls for targeting the United States person
without a warrant. The Administration has stated that what it labels
the Terrorist Surveillance Program “is narrowly tailored to target
only communications where one party is outside the United States
and there are reasonable grounds to believe that at least one party is
a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
68
organization.” Of course in any such a situation it would be possible
to seek a FISA warrant, but the essence of the program is the decision
to forgo that approach in favor of warrantless surveillance. The
international communications involving someone connected to al Qaeda, but may extend
as well to those who are in contact with those who have been in touch with someone
connected to al Qaeda. See generally Seymour M. Hersh, Listening In, NEW YORKER,
May 29, 2006, at 25 (describing the use of the technique of “chaining” to identify
additional individuals who are considered to be of interest, based on their contacts with
others who have already come to the attention of NSA).
68. DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses to
Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 7.
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Administration has not been entirely clear in explaining why it
considers the FISA process inadequate, but two possibilities readily
suggest themselves: (1) Under the program, NSA is using a standard
for probable cause that is easier to meet than the one that would be
applied by the FISC; or (2) The same standard is being used for
probable cause, but the resources needed to prepare applications,
along with the delays and risks of using the formal FISA process, are
considered unacceptable.
The probable cause standard being used in the program, and the
significance of any delays that would result if FISA were used, will be
discussed below. However, before proceeding to address those issues
it is worthwhile to summarize the apparent differences between the
current warrantless surveillance program and the NSA intercept
programs that were in place before 9/11. As described above, FISA
does not flatly prevent NSA from intercepting, processing, analyzing,
and distributing international communications by, from, or about
United States persons in the United States.
Many such
communications may come to the agency’s attention as it intercepts
broad categories of communications, or because United States
persons are in contact with suspected terrorists overseas. There are
some limits on the retention and distribution of such unintentionally
acquired information about United States persons, but the
information can be used if it is needed to help analysts understand the
communications. When interception takes place outside the United
States, FISA regulates the targeting of communications to or from a
69
particular United States person in the United States. That requires a
FISA warrant based on probable cause. What concerns the agency is
that without targeting the suspected United States person it will not
acquire all international communications that are potentially relevant,
only those that are intercepted using some criterion or criteria other
than the identity of the United States person. The warrantless
69. FISA requires a warrant before international electronic communications of
United States persons within the United States are targeted. What is often overlooked is
that a warrant is not required when those communications are acquired overseas through
interception that targets someone else. For example, Judge Richard A. Posner recently
analyzed a hypothetical in which a suspected terrorist in a foreign country is calling
someone in the United States. Richard A. Posner, Wire Trap: What if Wiretapping
Works?, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 2006, at 15. Judge Posner states that a warrant is needed
if “the party on the U.S. side of the conversation is a ‘U.S. person.’” To the contrary, no
warrant is needed if the target of the interception is the suspected terrorist overseas, or if
the acquisition is done on any basis other than “by intentionally targeting” a United States
person. Thus, as described supra in the text accompanying notes 47-66, FISA is not as
restrictive as is sometimes assumed.
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surveillance program is based on the fear that some relevant
communications may slip through the cracks, in a situation in which
the government either cannot get a FISA warrant or is unwilling to do
so. Warrantless surveillance may also be an easier and cheaper way
to screen possible terrorists than using other investigative techniques.
When the government makes the choice between getting a FISA
warrant or choosing not to do so, it does so in the shadow of FISA’s
criminal sanction: “A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally
. . . engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as
70
authorized by statute
. . . .” Title III dovetails with FISA by
imposing criminal liability on one who, except “as otherwise
specifically provided” in Title III:
intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic
71
communication . . . .
Finally, Title III provides:
72

73

. . . [the] procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as
defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of
domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may
74
be conducted.
The argument up to this point has established that the
warrantless surveillance program involves “electronic surveillance”
regulated by FISA because international calls of United States
persons within the United States “are acquired by intentionally

70. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000). A violation “is punishable by a fine of not more
than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.” Id. at § 1809(c).
71. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(1)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006). In most situations, violations may
be punished by a prison term of up to five years. Id. at § 2511(4)(a).
72. The reference is to Title III, which has been codified as Chapter 119 of Title 18 of
the United States Code.
73. The reference is to Chapter 121 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2701-2712 (2000 & Supp. 2006), which addresses issues relating to the disclosure of the
contents of electronic communications that have been stored on an electronic
communications system.
74. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(f) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
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75

targeting” those United States persons.
Neither of the relevant
mechanisms for obtaining warrants – under FISA for electronic
surveillance or under Title III for all electronic communications – has
been utilized. Further, the statutory language quoted above makes it
clear that in the absence of a warrant such electronic surveillance is a
crime unless it is “authorized by statute.” Therefore, the warrantless
surveillance program violates the applicable statutes, and the
interceptions being carried out are federal crimes.
The Administration has somewhat indirectly confirmed that its
program does indeed fail to comply with the procedures set out in
FISA, although it has apparently never explicitly confirmed that the
problem arises specifically from the “targeting” of the
communications of United States persons. Even in recognizing the
conflict between the warrantless surveillance program and FISA, the
Administration has not exactly conceded that it has departed from
the FISA procedures:
[W]e note that the [Justice] Department’s legal analysis
assumes, solely for purposes of that analysis, that the
targeted interception of international communications
authorized under the Terrorist Surveillance Program
would constitute “electronic surveillance” as defined by
FISA. As noted in our January 19th paper, we cannot
confirm whether that is actually the case without
76
disclosing sensitive classified information.
Despite the caution displayed by the Justice Department’s
formulation, no doubt remains about the departure from FISA’s
procedures, and the use of the word “targeted” may also tend to
confirm that the fundamental legal difficulty with the program is that
it targets United States persons whose international communications
would otherwise be subject to interception only on the basis of some
other criterion or criteria.
Of course the Administration, even though forced to
acknowledge the existence of the warrantless surveillance program

75. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2005).
76. DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses to
Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 12; see id., Responses to Joint Questions from
House Judiciary Minority Members, at 10 (identical wording, except that the definition of
electronic surveillance is described as being “in” FISA). The legal analysis that the quote
refers to is that presented in the DOJ memorandum that is cited supra note 3.
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and unable to reconcile it with FISA’s procedures, has in no way
conceded that the program is illegal, and in fact it has mounted an
aggressive defense. The two theories upon which the Administration
attempts to bring the program into line with FISA are these:
The warrantless surveillance program was “authorized by statute”
when Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (“AUMF”) shortly after 9/11.
If the AUMF is not accepted as authorizing the program, it is
unconstitutional for FISA to prohibit the warrantless surveillance
program, since this intrudes on the inherent constitutional
authority of the President.
This is not the occasion to undertake a detailed analysis of the
constitutional issues raised by these defenses of the warrantless
surveillance program. Indeed, it may well be that a satisfactory and
complete analysis of those issues must await the disclosure of
additional information about the program and the way in which it is
being carried out. However, even a preliminary analysis of these
arguments demonstrates that they provide very slender reeds to
support the program.
V. The AUMF Does Not Authorize the Warrantless
Surveillance Program
Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(the “AUMF”) on September 14, 2001, and it became law when
77
President Bush signed it on September 18, 2001. The legislation
authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of
September 11, 2001, or those who harbored those responsible for the
attacks. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated that the AUMF “is the
78
kind of congressional action the FISA law anticipated.”

77. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
78. Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance
Authority: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, February 6, 2006 (morning
session) (Lexis, News Library) [hereinafter Feb. 6, 2006 Judiciary Committee Hearing]
(testimony of Attorney General Gonzales).
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The Administration sees the current dispute as essentially a
79
rerun of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the case involving a man who had been
born in the United States (and thus was a U.S. citizen), though his
parents had returned to their native Saudi Arabia with Hamdi while
he was still a young boy. Late in 2001, he was seized in Afghanistan
by the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups aligned with
the United States in its fight against the Taliban, and he ended up a
prisoner of the United States. He was labeled an enemy combatant
based on his alleged training with the Taliban, service in a Taliban
unit which continued after September 11, 2001, and possession of an
80
assault rifle while in the field with his Taliban unit. The Supreme
Court ultimately remanded the case for further proceedings designed
to provide Hamdi an opportunity, in compliance with due process
requirements, to dispute the government’s allegations. Even before
reaching the due process issues, the Court needed to decide if holding
Hamdi in the first place violated a statute that provides that no citizen
may be imprisoned or detained by the United States “except pursuant
81
to an Act of Congress.” The Court divided 5-4 on that issue, with
the majority holding that the detention of enemy combatants is an
incident of waging war, since it serves the purpose of preventing those
who have been captured from returning to the field and taking up
82
arms again.
United States armed forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan,
as ordered into battle by the President pursuant to the authority given
him by the AUMF, unquestionably had the right to capture and hold
enemy fighters. It turned out that Hamdi was a citizen of the United
States, but there “is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own
83
citizens as an enemy combatant.”
The disposition of Hamdi
provides scant support for the proposition that the AUMF is a statute
authorizing warrantless surveillance that is otherwise prohibited by
FISA. The 1971 statute on which Hamdi relied was designed to guard
against a repetition of the type of mass internment such as that

79. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
80. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-13 (plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor). The government’s allegations on these points were supported by a declaration of Michael Mobbs,
an official of the Department of Defense.
81. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (O’Connor, J.) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)).
82. Id. at 518 (O’Connor, J.). The four Justices joining in Justice O’Connor’s plurality
opinion were joined, on this issue, by Justice Thomas. Id. at 579, 586-87.
83. Id. at 519 (O’Connor, J.). The plurality noted that one of the Nazi saboteurs
claimed to be a citizen of the United States. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942).
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imposed on those of Japanese descent during World War II. The
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the statute should be
allowed to deprive the President of one of the core aspects of
successfully fighting an enemy – preventing captured opponents from
being allowed to return to the fight after being captured.
FISA comprehensively and precisely regulates NSA efforts to
intercept international communications of United States persons who
are in the United States. It states explicitly that warrantless electronic
surveillance is illegal unless authorized by statute, yet at no time in
the legislative process that led to the AUMF was there the slightest
hint that the operation of FISA would in any way be affected. One of
85
the companion cases to Hamdi, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, had the
potential to shed some light on whether the AUMF should be
interpreted to limit earlier statutes having nothing to do with the
combat operations conducted under authority of the AUMF. Padilla,
a citizen of the United States, had been taken into custody inside the
United States, and held in military custody. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the government’s
argument that the AUMF authorized this detention, but the Supreme
Court held that Padilla’s habeas corpus petition had been filed in the
wrong district. When the case was refiled, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit upheld the government’s AUMF argument, but
that case too was diverted when the United States transferred Padilla
to civilian custody for trial rather than defending in the Supreme
Court the holding that the AUMF granted authority for continued
military detention.
It would be extraordinary if the precisely-crafted FISA
framework, which has been explicitly amended by Congress five times
86
since 9/11, could silently be altered in the way that the
Administration contends, particularly since the AUMF was adopted
without there being any reference to NSA, to its mission, to the
targeted interception of international communications of United
States persons within the United States, or to any aspect of FISA.

84. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (O’Connor, J.).
85. 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The litigation was revived in the Fourth Circuit, and the
Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari. Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006),
denying cert. in 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
86. Feb. 6, 2006 Judiciary Committee Hearing (Sen. Leahy), supra note 78.
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VI. Recognition of the Fact That FISA Prohibits
the Warrantless Surveillance Program
Does Not Make FISA Unconstitutional
Perhaps the most creative, but least well defined, arguments
advanced in support of the warrantless surveillance program are
those suggesting that if FISA prohibits the program the statute itself
must be unconstitutional as an impairment of the President’s
“inherent constitutional authority” under Article II of the
Constitution.
The invocation of the President’s inherent
constitutional authority has become something of a mantra for the
Administration, and the felicitous phrase is repeated again and again,
yet there are almost no developed principles of constitutional law that
establish what those powers are or how they are affected by
legislation passed by Congress. The reference to “inherent” powers is
itself somewhat misleading, since the arguments in support of the
warrantless surveillance program are grounded in the text of the
Constitution, especially the very first sentence in Article II, which
vests the “executive Power” in the President, and the Commander-inChief provision. Of course, there are a number of other parts of the
constitutional text that are not helpful in defending the program, and
therefore are rarely cited by the Administration. The President “shall
87
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” and Congress is
granted broad legislative powers over the military, over commerce
(which includes telecommunications), and over the public purse.
The brass-knuckles argument vigorously advanced by the
Administration is that if FISA prohibits NSA from the warrantless
targeting of international communications of United States persons in
the United States for interception, then the statute is
unconstitutional. There does not appear to be any precedent even
vaguely on point – that is, where Congress legislated in an area within
its legislative authority and it was nonetheless held by the Supreme
Court that the President had inherent authority to act contrary to the
statute. The possibility that such a situation could arise cannot be
dismissed altogether, since a statute that is unconstitutional may
properly be declared void by the Supreme Court, but the White
House in effect urges adoption of a new and entirely unprecedented
principle that would declare unconstitutional all legislation that

87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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prevents the President from doing anything he considers useful in
defending the country.
88
The celebrated Steel Seizure Case is the precedent most nearly
on point, and it offers no support at all for the proposition that FISA
is unconstitutional if it in any way inhibits the President’s freedom of
action as Commander in Chief. In the midst of the bruising Korean
War, President Truman feared that an impending nationwide strike in
the steel industry would prevent the nation from producing the
armaments needed to sustain the military. Therefore, he ordered the
Secretary of Commerce to take control of the steel mills in order to
assure that production of the vital material would continue. In that
case, Congress had never passed a statute forbidding seizure of
productive resources, although it had failed to pass legislation that
would have granted the President the power to make such seizures.
The President was no doubt sincere in his belief that a strike would
seriously undermine the war effort, but the Supreme Court held the
seizure unconstitutional.
Perhaps most pertinently for present purposes, not only did the
result in Steel Seizure go against the power claimed by the President,
but the influential concurring opinion of Justice Jackson articulated a
method for approaching situations in which the Executive’s actions
deal with the same matters as those on which Congress could act.
“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
89
can delegate.” That principle would be applicable if the AUMF
authorized the warrantless surveillance program, but for the reasons
discussed above that is a most improbable interpretation of the
AUMF. Justice Jackson’s second category, which addresses the
situation where “the President acts in absence of either a
90
congressional grant or denial of authority,” is not alleged by anyone
to control the present controversy. Justice Jackson’s third category,
the one to which he consigned President Truman’s steel seizure itself,
is this:
When the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
88. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
89. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
90. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J.).
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constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive
Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive
must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is
the equilibrium established by our constitutional
91
system.
The President, Attorney General Gonzales, General Hayden,
and others defending the warrantless surveillance program have
repeatedly stated that the President considers the program a desirable
and effective one that makes it easier for him to prosecute the fight
against al Qaeda successfully. However, even if those highly debated
assertions are assumed to be true, they do not come close to
establishing that the President’s Article II powers are being violated
simply because the legislative choice made by Congress prevents him
from acting in exactly the manner that he prefers. Congress
unquestionably has broad powers that are applicable, since it can
regulate the interstate and foreign communications industry under
the commerce clause, and also regulate the military. Even Attorney
General Gonzales has conceded as much:
Well, the fact that the president . . . may have inherent
authority doesn’t mean that Congress has no authority in
a particular area. And we look at the words of the
Constitution and there are clear grants of authority to the
Congress in time of war. And so if you’re talking about
competing constitutional interests, that’s when you get
92
into sort of the third part of the Jackson analysis.
The claimed “inherent constitutional authority” that would
permit a President to act contrary to a statute whenever he feels that
it is necessary to do so in order to successfully prosecute a war, or to
defend the country against attack or subversion from abroad, or to
conduct the foreign relations of the United States, could not easily be
cabined by any defensible limiting principle. Perhaps seeing the need
for there to be limits in order to make the theory more palatable,
91. Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J.) (footnote omitted).
92. Feb. 6, 2006 Judiciary Committee Hearing (afternoon session) (testimony of
Attorney General Gonzales), supra note 78.
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President Bush has stated that assassination would be impermissible:
“I don’t think a president can order the assassination of a leader of
another country with which we’re not at war. There are clear red
93
lines.” While assassination would be reprehensible, it is difficult to
see why it would necessarily be illegal if the warrantless surveillance
program is not. FISA prohibits the surveillance program, but there is
94
no statute that prohibits assassinations. Thus, for purposes of a Steel
Seizure analysis along the lines suggested by Justice Jackson,
assassination would not be in the third category (as the current FISA
controversy is), but rather in one of the first two categories. The
Administration has placed great emphasis on intelligence collection
as a traditional aspect of warfare and national defense, but surely
assassination of enemy leaders and agents is similarly intertwined
with the history of warfare and international conflict. If the unformed
constitutional theory advanced by the Administration were to be
accepted, judicial supervision of its boundaries would be difficult if
not impossible. In practical terms, the President would have secured
95
the “blank check” that the Hamdi Court withheld.
Application of the theory of claimed “inherent constitutional
authority” to the facts of the warrantless surveillance program cannot
proceed much further without a lot more information about the
nature and implementation of the program. However, I see no
realistic possibility that the facts, once known, will lead to the
conclusion that the President’s constitutional authority is being
96
usurped. Since the Administration is claiming, in essence, that the
President cannot function effectively as Commander in Chief without
the ability to bypass the FISC on surveillance of certain international
communications, it would need to make a detailed case that has not
yet been made (at least in public) – that the need to get warrants in
the situations covered by the program has a dramatic effect on his
93. Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Bush and His Senior Aides Press On in Legal
Defense for Wiretapping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at A13.
94. After the Church Committee exposed CIA assassination plots, there was
consideration of legislation to prohibit assassination. “However, President Ford headed
off such legislation by adopting” an executive order “prohibiting U.S. employees from
engaging in ‘political assassination.’” STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 373 (3d ed. 2002). The current prohibition remains part of an executive order rather
than a statute. See Executive Order 12,333, supra note 55, at § 2.11.
95. Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor) (“a state
of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s
citizens”).
96. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the statute that substantially restricted presidential ability to remove an independent counsel).
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ability to perform as Commander in Chief. If the case were made,
there is no reason to predict that the potential constitutional collision
between Article II and FISA, as predicted by the Administration,
would actually take place. Congress built a number of safety valves
97
into FISA as originally written, and it has repeatedly amended the
statute to meet the Administration’s concerns after 9/11. Rather than
identifying changes that it claims need to be made in FISA, either on
constitutional or policy grounds, the Administration has chosen
instead, in secret, to act contrary to the statute.
Not enough is publicly known about the program to permit a full
exploration of the constitutional assertions being made by the
Administration. There are dramatic inconsistencies pervading the
various assertions being made about the program, and many of the
most important facts have not yet been disclosed to the public. One
critical unknown is the size of the program. The original New York
Times article disclosing the existence of the program reported that
officials familiar with it had said that NSA was eavesdropping on “up
98
to 500 people in the United States at any given time.”
More
recently, Seymour Hersh wrote that a government consultant told
him “that tens of thousands of Americans had had their calls
99
monitored in one way or the other.” The magnitude of the program,

97. When Congress declares war, warrantless electronic surveillance is permitted for
15 days. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000). In an emergency, electronic surveillance may be
instituted immediately, so long as an application for a FISA warrant is filed within 72
hours. Id. at § 1805(f). A major concern expressed by the Administration about the 72hour provision, in addition to its brevity and the fact that it is only available when the
FISA probable cause standard is expected to be met, is that if emergency interception
begins and no FISA warrant is issued, the target might then be notified. Feb. 6, 2006
Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 78 (afternoon session) (testimony of Attorney
General Gonzales) (if an order is not obtained, “the presumption is that the judge will
then notify the target of that surveillance during that 72-hour period”).
98. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1; see Barton Gellman, Dafna Linzer & Carol D.
Leonnig, Surveillance Net Yields Few Suspects; NSA’s Hunt for Terrorists Scrutinizes
Thousands of Americans, but Most Are Later Cleared, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2006, at A1
(“Two knowledgeable sources placed [the number of Americans who have had their
conversations recorded or their e-mails read without warrants] in the thousands; one of
them, more specific, said about 5,000.”).
99. Hersh, supra note 67, at 25. The important ambiguity in the reported statement is
whether the monitoring being described involves the contents of the communications,
which implicates FISA, or whether only transactional information is being acquired. See
generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS IN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT
AMENDMENTS (2006); Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional
Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L.
& POL’Y 37 (2005).
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which the Administration has so far refused to reveal, has significant
implications for a number of the other arguments being advanced in
support of the program.
One recurrent theme advanced in support of the program is that
the standard of “probable cause” being used by NSA in carrying out
the program is the same standard as that used by the FISC. If true,
this assertion may help to blunt concerns being raised about entirely
100
innocent individuals having their communications intercepted.
However, if the total number of United States persons being targeted
in the United States has increased dramatically, that would strongly
suggest that a lower standard of probable cause is being used. The
Administration has been careful in most instances to state that “a”
probable cause standard is being used, often buttressed by a citation
101
to the recent Supreme Court decision in Maryland v. Pringle that is
designed to show that it does not take very much information to
102
establish probable cause. It is far from clear that Pringle, properly
understood, supports the low threshold of suspicion that the
Administration claims is sufficient. The case involved arrests made
when three men all were in a car stopped for speeding at 3:15 a.m.
The driver consented to a search of the vehicle, which led to the
discovery of a roll of money and five baggies containing cocaine.
None of the men would say who owned the drugs and the money, so
the police arrested all three. Pringle later admitted that the cocaine
was his, but challenged the legality of the arrest. The Court
concluded that “there was probable cause to believe Pringle
committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or
jointly,” since “it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common
103
enterprise among the three men.”
Although the government repeatedly cites Pringle as reflecting
the appropriate standard of probable cause, one of the cases
distinguished by the Supreme Court’s decision in Pringle may more
closely resemble the circumstances of United States persons who

100. Even if the standards were established to be the same, the core concerns of the
Fourth Amendment would remain a serious obstacle to upholding the legality of the
program, since the critical determination on probable cause is made by an NSA employee
rather than by a detached and neutral magistrate. “The Fourth Amendment contemplates
a prior judicial judgment.” Keith, supra note 10, 407 U.S. at 317.
101. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
102. See, e.g., DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses
to Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 30 (the “‘reasonable grounds to believe’
standard is a ‘probable cause’ standard of proof, see Maryland v. Pringle”).
103. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 372-73.
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have some contact with an al Qaeda adherent without manifesting
104
membership in or allegiance to the group. In Ybarra v. Illinois,
police officers had obtained a search warrant authorizing them to
search a tavern and its bartender for evidence of drugs. The Court
held that the warrant did not permit pat-down searches of the patrons
who were in the bar at the time the warrant was executed, absent
105
individualized suspicion.
Thus, to the extent that the program
targets United States persons based on ambiguous contacts with
suspected al Qaeda members, it seems very likely that the standard of
probable cause being applied is not as demanding as the one that
would be applied by the FISC.
The government has denied that it is changing the standard of
probable cause, arguing that the principal reason for using FISA in
the situations within the warrantless surveillance program is that
“pursuing ‘prior judicial review by the FISA court’ requires
106
significantly more time.”
However, in establishing internal
procedures and in allocating resources, the Justice Department and
other agencies can exert substantial influence on the speed of the
FISA process. Even if administrative changes need to be made in
order to allow FISA warrants to be obtained more quickly in some
cases, it hardly seems likely that such inconveniences could amount to
an intrusion into the President’s sphere sufficient to allow him to
triumph in a “category three” case. Justice Jackson’s formulation
places presidential power at its lowest ebb when the President acts in
violation of a statute. Given that over 2,000 FISA warrants were
107
granted last year, it could not possibly be the case that the need to
get another 500 – or even another 1,000 – would be a difficulty of
constitutional dimension, even if expedition were needed in some
instances. Admittedly, there might be a serious problem if the need
arose to get 10,000 warrants a year, but that would provide irrefutable
proof that the probable cause standard being applied had been
substantially diluted from that used by the FISC. Moreover,
Congress has shown itself quite willing to give prompt and
sympathetic consideration to any proposed FISA modifications that
are shown to be necessary, but the Administration has spurned those
overtures.
104. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
105. Id. at 92-93.
106. DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses to
Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 14; see id. at 38-39.
107. See supra note 27.
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Conclusion
The Administration has been very successful so far in
withholding from the public the details of the warrantless surveillance
program, making a precise assessment of its legality very difficult to
carry out. However, it appears that the core violation being
committed is the targeting of international calls involving United
States persons in the United States who appear to have had at least
some contact with someone connected to al Qaeda, but where it is
uncertain that the FISC would find that there is probable cause to
believe that the potential target is an agent of a foreign power.
FISA plainly requires a warrant in the situations described. The
AUMF cannot plausibly be taken to have provided statutory
authorization
for
warrantless
interceptions
under
these
circumstances. Moreover, the “inherent constitutional authority”
theory advanced by the Administration flies in the face of the classic
Steel Seizure formula of Justice Jackson that places the President’s
power at its lowest ebb when he acts contrary to a statute. If a
President is permitted to violate a comprehensive and long-standing
statutory system, without even seeking to obtain desired adjustments
from Congress, our system of separation of powers will be altered in
ways that are both radical and undesirable.

